US Business Executives and Politicians are masters at defining a problem (oversimplifying it, of course), giving it a catchy name, and then setting up a program with an equally catchy name which will "solve the problem." Gun control is a good example. If you can define the problem as "Guns" then a program called "Gun Control" will "solve the problem." Of course, the problem isn't guns, the problem is deeply rooted in human nature, and it's not susceptible to a quick fix. This weeks "Reporter" has a nice example of the "quick fix" approach. The headline is: "Strange Bedfellows. Canefarmers out in the cold again!" You can find the article at http://www.belizereporter.com/article3.html. It paints BSI as the bad guy, out to screw the poor cane farmers out of some rightful income. The rightful income, is a share of the bagasse which BSI intends to sell to a new Cogeneration Company. However, the article does not really give you the whole story, altho it alludes to most of the facts. Fact 1. When Bagasse was a waste product, BSI tried to get the Cane Farmers to share in the cost of disposing of it. "No," said the farmers. "That's part of your cost of doing business." Fact 2. Suddenly, the Bagasse is worth money. (Interesting, isn't it, how technology can change not only perception, but reality as well.) Now, the farmers want to share in that money. Comment. We could ask "What did the farmers do to contribute to the change in perspective?" But no...the _Reporter_ didn't do that. It simply uses the Bad Guy approach. If BSI is the problem, we can get BSI to change and solve it. Sorry, it's not that simple. (Is it ever?) Fact 3. Almost all sugar companies outside of Belize pay by sugar content rather than by the weight of the cane. Not so in Belize. BSI buys the cane and produces the bagasse as a by-product of the refining process. Who owns the bagasse? Looks like BSI bought and paid for it. Fact 4. In fact, BSI desperately want to pay by sugar content, and the cane farmers have fought that change. If BSI could pay by sugar content, they would automatically reward the sugar farmers who are using improved techniques to produce better cane as well as more cane. Many of the farmers, however, are stuck in the middle of the last century with their growing techniques, and as Peter likes to point out, it's really hard to get anybody to change in Belize. Certainly not a third generation cane farmer who's still doing it like his grandpappy.
Fact 5. There are roughly 7000
sugar growers in Belize.
They represent a potent political
force, if only half of
them vote.
Fact 6. The article calls the cane
farmers "stakeholders."
Indeed they are. So is BSI. It is
a symbiotic
relationship: Neither can do it
without the other. They
both should be interested in profit
-- and we are pretty
sure that BSI isn't in it for the
fun, power, prestige. I'm
not so sure about the cane farmers.
Fact 7. There are four times as
many cane trucks in
northern Belize as are needed to
haul sugar. There are at
least twice as many loaders, and
most are woefully under
utilized. All it would take is a
little organization on the
part of the cane farmers to cut
their costs, cut the amount
of time they spend waiting in line
at the mill, and of
course, make more money.
Comment. The cane farmers can get
organized when they want
to bitch and moan about the sugar
market and the mill end.
Too bad they can't get organized
about their own business of
growing cane, cutting it, and
getting it to the factory.
Just an interested bystander in
cane country.
Maintained by Ray Auxillou, Silvia Pinzon, MLS, and Marty Casado. Please email with suggestions or additions for this Electronic Library of Belize. |